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TRIAL
by

Arch C. McColl*
Voir Dire; Guilt-Innocence Phase Evidence; Punishment Phase Evidence;
Judicial and ProsecutorialMisconduct; Jury Charge
A. Voir Dire
In Pogue v. State " the court clerk had mistakenly called the name of a
juror whom the defendant had struck by peremptory challenge from the list
of veniremen. Although the trial court had already excused the remaining
veniremen at the time defense counsel called the error to his attention, the
jurors had not yet been sworn. The court of criminal appeals held that the
trial court committed reversible error by allowing the juror to serve. Thus,
absent a showing of bad faith,465 defense counsel is sufficiently diligent if he
467
advises the trial court ' of such an error before the jury is sworn.
In Brattie v. State6 the defendant, convicted of capital murder, complained that during voir dire the trial court had improperly prohibited questioning about the veniremens' understanding of the phrase "criminal acts of
violence." The court, however, affirmed the conviction, holding that jurors
"are supposed to know" 469 the ordinary meaning of words which are "simple in themselves.' 470 The court explained its holding by stating that the
legislature did not define "criminal acts of violence"; thus, the phrase falls
within the statutory provision that words and phrases which are not defined
47
are to be "understood in their usual acceptation in common language."1 '
Therefore it would be paradoxical for the Legislature to presume that
members of a panel know the meanings of such terms of 'reasonable
doubt,' 'criminal acts of violence,' 'sound memory and discretion,' and
4

* A.B., Princeton University; J.D., St. Mary's University. Briefing Attorney, Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals; Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
464. 553 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
465. The court's statement that "no bad faith is contended or shown," id. at 370, implies
that a different result would have been reached if the record had reflected that defense counsel
knew of the mistake before the remainder of the panel had been excused, but said nothing until
afterward:
466. To obtain a clearer appellate record, the court recommended that counsel mark through
the peremptorily struck name and place beside it the number of the strike being exercised. Id. at
370 n. I. The court also quoted with approval Munson v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. 498, 31 S.W. 387
(1895), in which the court stated that upon counsel's discovery of the mistake, the following
motions were advisable: to withdraw the plea; to discharge the jury; and to draw another jury
panel. 553 S.W.2d at 369.
467. If the mistake is discovered after the jury is sworn, error is present only if the record
reflects that the juror was prejudiced against the defendant. Ac9sta v. State, 522 S.W.2d 528
(Tex. Crim. App. 1975). Presumably, such disqualifying "prejudice" would be the same as that
which satisfies a challenge for cause under TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16 (Vernon
Supp. 1978).
468. 551 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
469. Id. at 404 (quoting Joubert v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. 219, 222, 124 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1939)
(emphasis added)).
470. 551 S.W.2d at 404.
471. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 3.01 (Vernon 1977).
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on the other hand for the Court to hold that a trial court has abused its

discretion in not allowing a defendant to inquire of each
member of the
472
panel as to his or her undersiandingof such terms.

As a matter of legislative construction, however, it does not follow that
because the legislature intended undefined terms to be "understood in their
usual acceptation in common language," that it also conclusively presumed

that everyone accurately understands such usage. Further, as a practical
matter, because a potential juror is "supposed to know" the common
meaning of legal terms does not mean that he actually does. If a venireman
cannot be questioned about his understanding of certain terms either in the
abstract or as applied to certain hypothetical situations, the presumption of

understanding is conclusive. Consequently, there is no protection for the
defendant against (I) the juror who misunderstands the definition of the
phrase; 473 (2) the juror who has no definite understanding as to the meaning
of the term and is thus more receptive to the legal standards of his fellow
jurors; 474 or (3) the juror who understands the concept but cannot apply it
according to law. 475 Indeed, it is clear that, whether considered in the
abstract 476 or as applied to particular facts, 47 7 such broad, albeit "simple,"

terms as "criminal acts of violence" are subject to differing interpretations,
even by reasonable men.
Yet in Texas the defendant is entitled to a unanimous jury verdict. 478 Since
each juror may apply these broad phrases to particular facts based upon his
individual perspective, to cut off an inquiry into each potential juror's
understanding by what appears to be an irrebuttable 479 presumption may violate
472. 551 S.W.2d at 404 (emphasis added). The court also emphasized the fact that such
questioning could consume enormous amounts of time. Id. at 405.
473. In approving an extended inquiry into a prospective juror's'understanding of the phrase
"religious or conscientious scruple" against the death penalty, the Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), stated:
The critical question, of course, is not how the phrases employed in this area have
been construed by courts and commentators. What matters is how they might be
understood-or misunderstood-by prospective jurors. Any layman . . . [might]
say he has scruples if he is somewhat unhappy about death sentences ....
[Thus] a general question as to the presence of. . .reservation [or scruples] is far
from the inquiry which separates those who would never vote for the ultimate
penalty from those who would reserve it for the direst cases.
Id. at 516 n.9. The term "scruples," while used in the Code of Criminal Procedure, is not
defined. Hence, under the logic of the court in Brattie, a venireman need not be queried at
length about his understanding of the word "scruples" because it is not defined by the
legislature and thus is presumably "simple in itself."
474. Cf. People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977) ("Allen" or
"dynamite" jury charge held unconstitutional because it urged minority jurors to consider their
own status as dissenters, a consideration both rationally and legally irrelevant to the issue of
guilt).
475. Cf. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 514 n.7 (1968) (suggestion that a juror who
objects to capital punishment could still subordinate his personal views and abide by his oath to
obey law).
476. The classic question which often reveals a juror's misunderstanding of the abstract
principle, "proof beyond a reasonable doubt," is: "If the proof of crime required proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of five elements and the State sufficiently proved four, would that satisfy in
your mind, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt?"
477. The phenomenon of the "hung" jury is one obvious example of laymen disagreeing on
the application of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" based on their individual perspectives.
478. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13; Brown v. State, 508 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
479. If there is no opportunity to rebut the presumption that jurors understand certain legal
terms, the presumption is, of course, conclusive against the defendant. The court's opinion
implies that the trial court would not commit reversible error if it refused to allow counsel to ask
such questions of the jurors at a hearing on a motion for a new trial.
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due process and the right to a truly unanimous verdict. s °
In Collins v. State48' the defendant complained that the trial court improperly limited his voir dire examination of a prospective juror. The trial court
had refused to permit defense counsel to ask the juror whether she could
believe that a policeman "was telling a wilfull falsehood from that witness
stand. "482 On direct examination by the State the prospective juror answered that she would judge the police officer's testimony by the same
criteria she would apply to any other witness. The court of criminal appeals
affirmed the conviction, holding that because the defendant not only had an
unused peremptory challenge at the conclusion of the jury selection, but
also was allowed to ask that question of almost all the other prospective
jurors, no harm was shown.
Significantly, however, the defendant in Collins was assessed the death
penalty, a penalty "different . . . than any other ... . in both its severity
and finality. ' 4 3 Arguably, where a policeman is a material witness whose
testimony may lead to the imposition of death, a juror's unwillingness to
disbelieve his testimony may have as significant an impact on the ultimate
outcome of the trial as the juror who is predisposed to inflict the death
penalty. Further, since it is reversible error to refuse to allow the defense
counsel to show bias on the part of the policeman which may cause him to
shade his testimony, 484 the defendant should be allowed to determine
whether such evidence of bias would have any impact on a particular juror
or whether the juror would automatically reject the impeaching evidence.
Otherwise, the absolute right to impeach the testimony of a police officer
485
would be a hollow one.

Moore v. State4s6 raised a variety of voir dire issues. The defendant in
Moore complained that prospective jurors were called to the bench for
"excuses" in the presence of the other potential jurors. Moreover, those
offering excuses were not called in the order in which their names appeared
on the juror list, thus violating article 35.20.487 The court, however, affirmed
the conviction. Since the defendant failed to object to the procedure and
could not show that the remaining prospective jurors had heard the questions propounded, any error was waived.
480. Although the court relied heavily on Joubert v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. 219, 124 S.W.2d
368 (1939), for the proposition that jurors are supposed to know the meaning of simple terms,
Joubert dealt with the court's charge to the jury. Arguably, the presumption that jurors know
the meaning of such terms is valid only if those veniremen who misunderstand the terms are
eliminated.
481. 548 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
482. Id. at 371. In Brown v. United States, 358 F.2d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1964), Judge (now
Chief Justice) Burger stated that when there is important testimony from an official witness, a
query into the prospective juror's inclination to give more or less credence to the witness "is
not only appropriate, but should be given if requested."
483. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977).
484. Coleman v. State, 545 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
485. Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (right to present defensive
evidence is "fundamental" under the sixth amendment).
486. 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
487. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 35.20 (Vernon 1966) states, "[I]n selecting the jury
from the persons summoned, the names of such persons shall be called in the order in which
they appear upon the list furnished the defendant."
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A significant holding in Moore is that challenges for cause which are not
based on any specific statutory provision are allowable where circumstances
show that the juror "is incapable or unfit to serve on the jury.14 88 One
prospective juror stated that because she had two children, no husband, and
was not paid when she was not at work, she could not "keep her mind on the
case" because she would be worrying about having to pay her bills. The
court held that the statutory list 489 does not prescribe the exclusive basis of
challenge for cause and that "any juror who is going to be preoccupied by
personal problems so that she could not be fair is incapable or unfit to serve
4
on the jury." 90
Another significant holding in Moore is that in a capital murder prosecution the State may challenge for cause a venireman who is unable to consider
the minimum punishment for the lesser included offense of murder. The
prosecutor had explained to the prospective juror that if the State failed to
prove capital murder, the lesser included offense of murder carried a
minimum penalty of two years. When the prospective juror expressed her
antipathy to such a minor penalty for murder, the State successfully challenged her for cause. The court of criminal appeals held that under the
statute 491 the State could challenge for cause any prospective juror who had
a bias or prejudice against any phase of the law upon which the State was
entitled to rely. The fact that the defendant expressly waived objection to
the juror because of her bias did not call for a different result.
The court, however, admitted that "it is difficult to see why the State
would challenge the prospective juror on the basis stated." 492 Indeed, it is
inconceivable that the State would sincerely object to a venireman because
of his opposition to a minimum punishment. In fact, the prosecutor uses
what is actually a defensive challenge for cause as a sham device to avoid
using a peremptory challenge. Thus an unequal situation arises under which
the defendant is prohibited from challenging for cause jurors unable to give
the maximum penalty of death while the State is allowed to challenge for
cause jurors unable to give the minimum punishment.
At the close of the voir dire examination of one prospective juror in
Moore, defense counsel stated, "We'll submit the juror"; to which, the trial
court responded, "Overruled." 49 3 Noting that it was doubtful whether such
a remark could be construed as a challenge for cause, the court held that, in
any case, defendant failed to draw the court's attention to any of the
grounds urged on appeal. Further, the fact that the prospective juror was
merely uncertain as to whether he would change his vote if opposed by the
other jurors did not show sufficient cause for challenge. 4
488. Id. art. 35.16(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978) states, "[a] challenge for cause is an objection

made to a particular juror, alleging some fact which renders him incapable or unfit to serve on
the jury."
489.
490.
491.
492.

Id. arts. 35.16(a)(I)-(10).
542 S.W.2d at 669.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 35.16(b)(3) (Vernon 1966).
542 S.W.2d at 670.

493. Id.

494. Id. at 670-71. The court cited with approval Orange v. State, 76 Tex. Crim. 194, 173
S.W.297 (1915), where in answer to a similar question the juror stated, "I'm afraid and believe
it might" and the defense challenge for cause was overruled.
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Nevertheless, one juror's consideration of another's opinion as to guilt
has been held to be highly improper. 9 Because such improper consideration
may result in imposition of the death penalty, equivocal answers should be
considered sufficient to support a challenge for cause. As the Supreme
Court noted in Witherspoon v. Illinois,496 "unless the venireman states
unambiguously that he would vote his conscience even if his position were
opposed by eleven other jurors, it simply cannot be assumed that that is his
position.

'"491

In affirming a conviction for capital murder in Boulware v. State,498 the
court of criminal appeals held that because the defendant failed to object to
an improper exclusion of veniremen at trial, he could not assert the error on
appeal. 499 This holding, however, may conflict with Davis v. Georgia: °°
which held that if a single venireman is improperly excluded, any subsequent imposed death penalty cannot stand.
B. Guilt-Innocence Phase Evidence
In Hayter v. State50 1 the court of criminal appeals reversed a conviction
for burglary because hearsay evidence was improperly admitted. The defendant claimed that he was in a car with the complainant because he had
heard from numerous employees at work that a woman waited in the parking
lot almost daily and seduced passers-by. The State called to the stand an
investigator who had been assigned to determine the accuracy of this story.
The investigator testified that he had talked to fourteen employees at the
company. He was then asked if he had found "anything to indicate" that
there was a woman on the parking lot. Defense counsel's objection to this
question as calling for hearsay evidence was overruled. On appeal, the State
argued that the investigator was simply testifying to "negative results"; the
testimony was analogized to that received when one who examines books or
documents is allowed to testify that they do not contain certain information.102
In holding the testimony inadmissible, the court stated:
Although A may testify that he has examined business records and that
the records do not contain certain entries, B's testimony based on
information he received from A that no such entries are contained in the
records is not firsthand information; it is clearly hearsay and would not
be admissible. Although the State might have introduced testimony of
any or all fourteen employees that they had observed the parking lot at
relevant times and that they had not seen the complainant on the
parking lot, [the investigator's] testimony based on information he
495. See People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 849-50, 566 P.2d 997, 1004, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861,868
(1976).
496. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
497. Id.at 515 n.9.
498. 542 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
499. But cf. Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977) (federal habeas corpus relief
available upon a showing of incompetence of counsel where failure to object to introduction of
evidence constituted waiver under state law).
500. 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam).
501. 541 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
502. See, e.g., Rice v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 342, 93 S.W.2d 1149 (1936).
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received from the fourteen employees that the complainant had not
firsthand information; it is clearly
been on the parking lot was 50not
3
hearsay and is not admissible.
Walls v. State5°4 reversed a conviction for robbery by firearms because
evidence of an extraneous offense was improperly admitted. Although the
victim of the robbery made a positive identification of the defendant, a
police officer was also allowed to testify that four days later he arrested the
defendant immediately after he had robbed another citizen in a similar
manner. While this testimony was arguably admissible to show the context
of the arrest, the court of criminal appeals held that the extraneous offense
had no "legal relevance" 50 5 to the crime with which the defendant was
charged.
In United States v. Pariente5°6 the Fifth Circuit reversed a conviction for
transporting aliens because the prosecutor, among other things, 50 7 commented on the defendant's failure to call his wife to the stand. The court noted
that such comment is not always reversible error. 5°s Nevertheless, the court
balanced "the action of the prosecutor against the weight of the evidence"; 509 because in the instant case the evidence was circumstantial, the
error could not be considered harmless.
In affirming the conviction for barratry in Edwards v. State, 10 the court
of criminal appeals adopted specific requirements for the admissibility of
tape recordings in criminal trials. 511 Although the court recognized that the
admissibility of tape recordings is discretionary with the trial court, in order
to be admissible the tape recording must meet a seven-prong test which
includes: (1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking
testimony; (2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent; (3)
establishing the authenticity and correctness of the recording; (4) a showing
that no changes, additions, or deletions have been made; (5) a showing of the
manner of the preservation of the recording; (6) identifying the speakers;
and (7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without
any kind of inducement.512 The court, however, noted that many of these
513
requirements could be inferred from the testimony.
503. 541 S.W.2d at 437.
504. 548 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
505. Id.at 41.
506. 558 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1977).
507. The prosecutor also alluded to a "sworn statement" by a co-defendant who had
pleaded guilty. The statement had been ruled inadmissible but was used by the prosecutor in an
attempt to impeach the defendant. Id. at 1189.

508. See, e.g., United States v. Seay, 432 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1970) (prosecutor's comment on
failure of defendant's spouse to testify accompanied by an instruction to the jury was not error
where the evidence of guilt was substantial). But cf.San Fratello v. United States, 340 F.2d 560
(5th Cir. 1965) (comment on failure of defendant's spouse to testify was reversible error where
she was forced to claim her privilege against self-incrimination).
509. 558 F.2d at 1190.
510. 551 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
511. Although the court recognized that in the past it had not established what constituted a
proper foundation for the admissibility of sound recording, it also noted that such recordings
had generally been admitted. See Thrush v. State, 515 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974);
Yates v. State, 509 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974); Hutson v.
State, 164 Tex. Crim. 24, 296 S.W.2d 245 (1956).
512. 551 S.W.2d at 733.
513. For example, the court stated:
If a person who is in a position to hear a conversation testifies that he made a tape

480
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In Jackson v. State 14 the court reversed a conviction for robbery by
firearms because defensive evidence was erroneously excluded. In support
of his theory of misidentification the defendant attempted to introduce the
testimony of a citizen who had erroneously identified the defendant as the
perpetrator of a crime which was later discovered to have been committed
by a third party. The offense for which the defendant had been misidentified
and the instant offense occurred within one month of each other. The court
held that the excluded testimony was highly relevant to the defensive theory
"because it tended to prove not only that [the defendant] had been misidentified, but that his identity had been previously confused with John Lewis,
the person who confessed to the offense charged in the case at bar." ' '
Relying on Holt v. United States,516 the court concluded that where the
identity of the defendant is an important issue, evidence showing that a
person resembling the defendant was committing similar crimes at about the
same time and that one person had mistakenly identified the defendant is
admissible. In stating this general proposition, the court emphasized that the
time period involved was "not too remote," "nor too weak in probative
quality."517
Likewise, in Montemayor v. State5"' the court reversed a conviction for
aggravated assault upon a peace officer because defensive evidence was
improperly excluded. Relying upon a theory of self defense codified in the
Penal Code," 19 the defendant testified that the police officer had twice
assaulted him on the day of the alleged offense. During cross-examination
the officer admitted that he knew Oscar Antu but denied that he had ever
been in a fight with him. The defendant was denied the opportunity to call
Antu to the stand to rebut this testimony; out of the presence of the jury,
however, Antu testified that the officer had beaten him without provocation
in the Maverick County Jail. The court of criminal appeals held that it was
error to exclude such testimony, stating:
It is fundamental that when a witness in a criminal case testifies about a
specific fact or event, and that fact or event is more than a very minor
detail of his testimony, then the opposing side may present evidence to
rebut the testimony. Such impeachment goes directly to the credibility
recording of that conversation and that he had listened to the tape recording and
found it to coincide with what he heard the parties say, it goes without saying that
the recording device was 'capable of taking testimony' and that the 'operator of
the device was competent.'

Id.

514. 551 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
515. Id. at 352.
516. 342 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1965) (citing Commonwealth v. Murphy, 282 Mass. 593, 185 N.E.

486 (1933)).
517. 551 S.W.2d at 353. The court could have cited Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973), in which identity was hotly contested and the defendant was not allowed to present
evidence that another person committed the crime. The Supreme Court stated that "nothing is
more fundamental than the right of the Defendant to present evidence in his own behalf." Id. at
302.
518. 543 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
519. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 9.31(a) (Vernon 1974). That section provides: "[a] person is
justified in using force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force
is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful
force."
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of the witness, a factor that in many cases may critically affect the
outcome of the prosecution. 20
In addition, the court stated that "the right to impeach the prosecution's
witnesses is also one aspect of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation." 52 '
In Robinson v. State522 the court of criminal appeals reversed a conviction
for capital murder because of the improper admission of evidence that a
state witness had taken and passed a polygraph test. The state sought to
justify the admission on the grounds that the defendant had "opened the
door" to the evidence by showing a part of a plea bargain agreement; thus
the state argued it was entitled to show the remainder of the agreement,
namely, the taking and passing of a polygraph test. The court rejected that
argument noting that the purpose of article 38.24523 is to dispel a "false
impression" from the jury's hearing only part of a conversation or a writing.
But the very reason that evidence of a polygraph examination is not normally524 admissible is because of its unreliability.
Therefore, the state was asking the court to permit it to dispel a purportedly false impression by evidence of the witness' having taken an unreliable
test. Significantly, the court also held that because the trial court had ruled
out of the presence of the jury that evidence of the polygraph examination
would be admissible if the defendant inquired about the plea bargain, it was
not necessary for the defendant to object in the presence of the jury when
25
such testimony was offered.
In Presswood v. State 26 the court reversed a conviction for the possession
of marijuana because the evidence was insufficient to connect the defendant
with the marijuana found in his car. The court stated that the only evidence
in the record tending to establish possession was that the defendant was the
driver of the automobile; the record failed to reflect how long the defendant
had been in possession and control of the automobile or who owned the
automobile.
Affirming a conviction for robbery by assault in Carter v. State,5 27 the
court construed the husband and wife privilege to apply only "to utterances
and not acts." 528 Through the testimony of a police officer the State developed the fact that the defendant's wife had identified him from a composite
picture appearing in the newspaper; on the basis of her identification the
police officer had assembled a photographic lineup from which the complainant identified the defendant. The majority distinguished Davis v.
State,529 which had held that it was improper for the State to prove that the
520. 543 S.W.2d at 94.
521. Id. (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1954)).
522. 550 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
523. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.24 (1966).

524. Evidence regarding polygraph examinations is not always inadmissible. When the
defendant erroneously states that he passed a polygraph test, the state may impeach his
testimony by showing that he did not. Lucas v. State, 479 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
525. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.09, § 6(d)(3).

526.
527.
528.
529.

548 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
550 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
Id. at 286.
160 Tex. Crim. 138, 268 S.W.2d 152 (1954).
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defendant's wife had actively participated in securing witnesses to refute his
testimony. In Davis the court concluded that the wife's active participation
in the State's case was "tantamount to a denial by her of the truthfulness of
Appellant's testimony." 5 30 Thus, the jury received the impression that the
wife would refute the testimony if she were allowed to testify. 531 The
majority contrasted the instant case because the wife's identification of the
composite in the newspaper was not used532 in any manner "to show [the
defendant's] participation [in the crime].,
In Clark v. State5 31 the court of criminal appeals granted habeas corpus
relief to a petitioner who had been viewed in his prison clothes by members
of the jury panel who later served on his actual jury. The petitioner had
timely objected"34 before jury selection had begun, and the court held that
his right to the presumption of innocence had been violated.
In Raley v. State5 35 a conviction for embezzlement was reversed by the

court of criminal appeals because a transcript from a previous trial containing a material witness's testimony was improperly admitted. In order to
admit the transcript of the testimony of an absent witness into evidence, in
derogation of the defendant's right of confrontation, the State must lay the
proper predicate.1 36 The court held that the state had failed to lay this
predicate because it failed to make a good faith effort to obtain the witness's
presence at trial. Since the previous trial the witness had moved to North
Carolina; the State, however, had not requested the trial court to issue a
summons to compel the attendance of the witness.5 37 Thus, because the
530. Id. at 140, 268 S.W.2d at 152.
531. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon 1966) (emphasis added) provides:
Neither husband nor wife shall, in any case, testify as to communications made by
one to the other while married. Neither husband nor wife shall, in any case, after
the marriage relation ceases, be made witnesses as to any communication made
while the marriage relation existed except in a case where one or the other is on
trial for an offense and a declaration or communication made by the wife to the
husband or by the husband to the wife goes to extenuate or justify the offense.
The husband and wife may, in all criminal actions, be witnesses for each other, but
except as hereinafter provided, they shall in no case testify against each other in a
criminal prosecution.
532. 550 S.W.2d at 285. The dissent, on the other hand, pointed out that in Johigan v. State,
482 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), the court held that "it is reversible error for the
State to show that the defendant's wife is assisting in the prosecution of the case, even though
she has not testified." 550 S.W.2d at 286.
533. 545 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
534. In Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that
the ultimate considerations in this type of.case are whether the accused was compelled to stand
trial in prison garb and did his failure to object sufficiently negate the presence of compulsion
necessary to establish a constitutional violation.
535. 548 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
536. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoC. ANN. art. 39.01 (Vernon 1966) provides:
When oath is made by the party using [prior testimony taken under oath, where
the opportunity for cross-examination was present] that th s witness resides outside the State; or that since his testimony was taken, the witness had died, or that
he had removed beyond the limits of the State, or that he has been prevented from
attending the court through the act or agency of the other party, or by the act or
agency of any person whosc object was to deprive the defendant of the benefit of
the testimony; or that by reason of age or bodily infirmity, such witness cannot
attend.
The court also cited Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), for the proposition that a witness is not
"unavailable" for the purposes of the introduction of prior testimony unless the prosecutorial
authorities have made a good faith effort to obtain his presence at trial. 548 S.W.2d at 36.
537. Under TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 24.28, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1978), the court
could have issued a summons to compel attendance since North Carolina at that time had
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State had not made the requisite good faith effort, the transcript was not
admissible.
In Cavender v. State538 the court reversed a conviction for murder because
the prosecutor asked an improper question of the defendant. On crossexamination of the defendant the prosecutor asked him whether he had told
his mother that he had stabbed and raped the deceased and that his mother
had relayed that information to his uncle. Upon defendant's objection to the
source of this question, the prosecutor responded that he had all the "real
evidence in the file that counsel needs. 53 9 In fact, out of the presence of the
jury the prosecutor explained that the basis for his question was that the
husband of the deceased said that one of his sisters told another that the
defendant had killed the deceased. The court held that the basis of the
question was hearsay several times removed. Thus, the question, together
with the indication that the prosecutor had hard evidence of such admission,
was harmful.
In United States v. Cooke540 the Fifth Circuit reversed a conviction for
mail fraud. Evidence of a civil consent decree which prohibited the defendant from doing certain acts related to selling securities was admitted by the
trial court. In the decree, however, the defendant had neither admitted nor
denied any wrongdoing. The Government argued that the injunctive decree
was admissible under federal rule 404(b)541 as evidence of a common scheme
to perpetrate fraud on investors. The court stated that even if rule 404(b)
applied the evidence was inadmissible under rule 403542 because the probative value was greatly outweighed by the prejudicial impact in an "entirely
5 43
circumstantial and largely uncorroborated case.
Upon similar reasoning the court of criminal appeals in Mallicote v.
State544 reversed a murder conviction because evidence of an extraneous
offense was erroneously admitted. The State introduced evidence that the
appellant was intoxicated at the time of the killing. In order to prove the
effect of alcohol on the defendant the State introduced evidence over the
objection of the defense, that two and one-half years earlier the defendant
while intoxicated had pointed a gun at the victim's brother. The court,
relying on Albrecht v. State,545 held that the probative value of the evidence
adopted provisions of the Uniform Act to secure the attendance of witnesses from without the
state. The Act also provides for the payment of compensation to nonresident witnesses. Id. §
4(b).

538. 547 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
539. Id. at 603.
540. 557 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1977).
541.

FED. R. EVID. 404(b) states:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

542. Id. 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."
543. 557 F.2d at 1155.
544. 548 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
545. 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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of the extraneous offense, if any, was far outweighed by its potentiality for
improper, unjustified, and inflammatory inferences against the accused.
Jiminez v. Estelle54 6 involved a federal habeas corpus proceeding in which
it was claimed that the defense counsel's failure to object to certain evidence in state court constituted a waiver of that right. The State contended
that because the issue of the alleged impropriety of the evidence had been
waived, it was not cognizable on habeas corpus. Although as a general rule
federal habeas review is barred by a state procedural waiver, there is,
547
nonetheless, an exception to this rule enunciated in Wainwright v. Sykes.
Despite the state procedural waiver, relief is available to the federal petitioner upon a showing of "cause" and "prejudice." The Fifth Circuit held
that the "incompetence48 of the trial counsel in the state court" may fall
5
within this exception.
C. Punishment Phase Evidence
In Aaron v. State549 evidence of extraneous offenses not alleged in the
indictment was introduced at the punishment phase of a trial for burglary in
the form of letters contained inside a penitentiary packet. Although the
letters referred to final convictions, which are proper subjects for consideration at the punishment stage of the trial, 55 1 proof of such convictions
may not be shown by mere references in letters. Rather, such proof must be
introduced through judgments upon which sentences can be based. The
error was held to be harmful and the court reversed.
In Gibson v. State551 a conviction for driving while intoxicated was reversed on the ground that the jury, rather than the trial court, assessed the
appellant's punishment. Prior to trial the defendant filed written motions
asking for probation and requested that the court assess punishment. The
trial court instead submitted the issue of punishment to the jury. In reversing, the court of criminal appeals noted that although article 37.07 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure 552 is ambiguously worded, the defendant should
not be required to have the jury assess his application for probation in every
jury trial. It is the responsibility of the trial court to assess punishment. The
jury may only assess punishment in cases where the defendant has invoked
the statutory right afforded by article 37.07; in the present case the defendin
ant had not made this election. This case makes uniform the procedure
5
both felony and misdemeanor courts where probation is requested. 1
In Kincheloe v. State554 the court of criminal appeals affirmed a conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon over the defendant's double
jeopardy objection. The defendant asserted that a murder conviction, used
546. 557 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977).
547. 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977).
548. 557 F.2d at 511.
549. 546 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
550. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978); Burton v. State,
493 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
551. 549 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
552.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.07, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).

553. Id. art. 42.12 (Vernon 1966) provides the procedure for probation in felony cases.
554. 553 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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as an element in the charged offense to show a prior conviction for a violent
felony, 55 had been used in the same manner in a prior conviction for
enhancement purposes. The defendant contended that because the murder
conviction had been used in the prior conviction for enhancement it could
not be used again for the same purpose in the instant case. Relying on Hill v.
State,5 56 the court of criminal appeals held without elaboration that using the
murder conviction as an element of both the instant offense and the prior
offense did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution.
The court of criminal appeals in Robinson v. State557 reversed a conviction for capital murder because the trial judge refused to allow the defendant
to elicit testimony from a psychologist at the punishment stage of the trial.
The record showed that the psychologist would have testified that in his
opinion it was improbable that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. 58 Because the
jury must be allowed to consider "all relevant evidence" at the punishment
stage of the trial,559 the exclusion of such evidence was improper and
reversible error.
In the capital murder case of Ghoulson v. State5' 6 a notebook cover
bearing the defendant's fingerprints was held to be admissible without the
contents at the guilt-innocence stage to link the defendant to the alleged getaway car in which the notebooks were found. The contents, which included
statements of intense hatred and proposed acts of violence against white
people generally, were then held to be admissible at the punishment stage
under article 37.07(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 61 Further, the
court held that the State was entitled to introduce the testimony at the
punishment stage of the trial of two psychiatrists who had interviewed the
defendant ex parte ,562 although no issue of insanity or competency had been
raised by the defendant. The court reasoned that if the defendant had
testified that he could be rehabilitated, then such testimony would have been
admissible in rebuttal.5 63 Therefore, the court "perceive[d] no reason why
555.

TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. app. art. 489c (Vernon 1974) (repealed 1973).

556. 158 Tex. Crim. 313, 256 S.W.2d 93 (1953) (use of a 1947 misdemeanor D.W.I. offense
on a prior occasion as an element of a felony D.W.I. did not prevent its use in the instant case).
557. 548 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
558.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978).

559. 548 S.W.2d at 66 (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)).
560. 542 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
561. The court cited Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), which, in construing TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07(I)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978), stated that "all possible relevant
information about the individual defendant" should be presented to the jury. 428 U.S. at 276.
Nevertheless, the court of criminal appeals acknowledged that "[t]he notebook in the instant
case does not purport to be a personal communication by or to either of appellants." 542
S.W.2d at 398. Moreover, the opinion did not reveal that the defendant had even read the
notebook or whether he subscribed to the stated philosophy. At the punishment stage of a trial,
if books which are not shown to have been read by the defendant, but which are taken from the
alleged get-away car are admissible, may books from the defendant's personal library which are
shown to have been read by him be introduced as well? See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (private possession of otherwise illegal films or reading material cannot be a crime).
562. "Counsel for appellants were not advised of the interviews nor were they present
during them." 542 S.W.2d at 400.
563. For the proposition that such evidence is admissible on rebuttal the court cited Armstrong v. State, 502 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), and Blankenship v. State, 432 S.W.2d
945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
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higher constitutional standards should be imposed for the admission of such
testimony when the State is presenting its case-in-chief than is required for
rebuttal testimony. ,564
The defense counsel's objection to the testimony, however, was appar-

ently based on the sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel rather than the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination.5 65 Had the fifth amendment question been raised, the issue would have
turned on whether the privilege survives after a verdict of guilty has been
returned by a jury but before punishment has been assessed. At least one
federal court 566 has held that where the defendant neither requests a psychiatric exam on the issue of "dangerousness" nor seeks to introduce testimony on that issue, he may not under the fifth amendment be compelled to
participate in a psychiatric exam to determine dangerousness for the punishment phase of trial,
The fifth amendment issue was raised in Livingston v. State,5 67 which
affirmed a capital murder conviction. The court rejected the argument that
the introduction of psychiatric testimony at the punishment stage of the trial

violated the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Noting that the psychiatrists did not testify at the guilt stage 5 68 the
majority of the court relied on language in United States v. Williams5 69 to
sustain admissibility of the testimony.

Williams, however, dealt with the rebuttal testimony of a psychiatrist
introduced at the guilt stage of the trial where the defendant had raised the
issue of insanity. By contrast, in Livingston neither the issue of incompeten-

cy nor insanity was raised. Further, the court of criminal appeals characterized the psychiatrists' description of the defendant as a "momentary,
unfavorable characterization." 570 That description is as follows: "[T]hat the
564. 542 S.W.2d at 400. Of course, under the fifth amendment of the Constitution, there is a
higher constitutional standard, indeed a prohibition, imposed upon the admissibility of testimony by the defendant when the State is presenting its case-in-chief; the defendant may, but
need not, later waive the privilege by testifying and submitting himself for cross-examination.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Because the defendant provided the basis of the
psychiatrist's testimony, the court's reasoning begs the real question: Did the psychiatrists,
through the court ordered examinations, acquire the basis for their damaging testimony against
the defendant in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination?
565. The court stated that it was not contended that the psychiatrists testified to any
incriminating statements made by the appellant to them during the course of the interviews in
violation of article 46.02. 542 S.W.2d at 400. At the time of trial Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 46.02, § 2(f)(4) (Vernon 1971) (emphasis added) provided: "No statement made by the
defendant during examination into his competency shall be admitted in evidence against the
accused on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding no matter under what circumstances
such examination takes place." Although the statute was subsequently amended, the language
remains substantially the same as the former version. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, §
3(g) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
566. Smith v. Estelle, No. CA 3-77-0544-F (N.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 1977).
567. 542 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
568. See note 565 supra.
569. 456 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1972), cited with approval in Stultz v. State, 500 S.W.2d 863 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973).
570. 542 S.W.2d at 662. The court borrowed this phrase from United States v. Williams, 456
F.2d at 218, where the court of appeals had so described the following testimony of a
psychiatrist, offered to rebut the defendant's plea of insanity:
[The] diagnostic impression was Mr. Williams's personality has to be characterized [as] suffering from personal disorder 'anti-social type.' . . . [M]y conclusions were that the defendant is not insane or psychotic, that he is responsible for
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Appellant was a sociopathic personality, an antisocial type, who had no

regard for another person's life or property, no remorse, that his condition
would not improve and he would remain a continuing threat to society." 571 It
is difficult to understand the characterization of such testimony as a
"momentary unfavorable characterization." More importantly, it is clear
that the position of the court of criminal appeals is that the fifth amendment
does not protect defendants from elicitation of such testimony at the punishment stage of the trial;5 72 this is true even where the testimony is based on

court ordered interviews with the defendant and the defendant has raised no
issue of insanity or incompetency nor offered psychiatric testimony on the
issue of his dangerousness.5 73 The question has not been resolved by the
United States Supreme Court.
D.

Judicial and Prosecutorial Misconduct

In Kincade v. State574 a conviction for disorderly conduct was overturned
because the trial judge made several comments improper under the terms of
article 38.05.175 The judge had castigated the appellant's counsel in front of

the jury for misleading and deceiving the jury and the court about certain
facts related to the arrest. 76 The court of criminal appeals held that the
judge's remarks were such as to be reasonably calculated to benefit the

State and, in turn, prejudice the defendant's rights.
In Elizondo v. State577 an improper jury argument resulted in reversal of a

conviction for delivery of heroin. The prosecutor, who had testified at trial,
told the jury "you do not pay me enough to come up here and perjure myself
and lie on the stand. 5 78 The court held that because the statement was made
repeatedly, and because it was "one of the primary thrusts" 5 79 of the closing
his actions, and I could detect no signs of irresistible impulse or anything of that
nature relating to the circumstances that led to his being before this Court.
The court stated: "Whatever tendency, if any, the appellation [anti-social type] had to incriminate Williams was slight and hardly more than the incrimination which always surrounds a
psychiatrist's testimony that a Defendant was responsible for his acts." d. Most courts have
held that where the defendant raises the issue of insanity or incompetency, the government has
a right to examine him for that limited purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Albright, 388 F,2d
719 (4th Cir. 1968). But see United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1042 (3d Cir. 1975) (dictum)
(statement elicited in a compelled examination appeared to be self-incrimination).
571. 542 S.W.2d at 661.
572. In Ex parte Davis, 542 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals held that at a writ of habeas corpus hearing on the denial of a bond in a capital murder
case, the testimony of a psychologist, secured over the defendant's objections, was admissible
on the issue of the defendant's propensity to commit future criminal acts of violence under
article 37.07(l). The court further held, however, that the testimony would not be admissible at
the trial for any purpose but did not elaborate on its reasoning.
573. Contra, Smith v. Estelle, No. CA 3-77-0544-F (N.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 1977).
574. 552 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
575. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.05 (Vernon 1966) provides:
In ruling upon the admissibility of evidence, the judge shall not discuss or
comment upon the weight of the same or its bearing in the case, but shall simply
decide whether or not it is admissible; nor shall he, at any stage of the proceeding
previous to the return of the verdict, make any remark calculated to convey to the
jury his opinion of the case.
576. 552 S.W.2d at 835.
577. 545 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
578. d. at 454.
579. Id. at 455.

488
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argument, the error was reversiblei8 0 Such argument, the court stated,
''conveys to the juror that the prosecutor has a basis for his conclusion in
58
addition to the evidence they have before them." '
An improper argument also led to reversal of a voluntary manslaughter
conviction in Dunbar v. State. 582 The district attorney stated to the jury that
"the fact that you have things in [the charge to the jury] on self defense and
voluntary manslaughter, doesn't mean that the court believes that is what
happened. ' 583 In holding that the prosecutor's reference to the trial court's
belief was improper, the court reaffirmed the four categories of argument
held permissible in McClory v. State:58 (I) summation of the evidence; (2)
to argument of opposing
reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3)5 answer
85
enforcement.
law
for
plea
a
(4)
or
counsel;
In Cook v. State,5 86 an appeal from a conviction of heroin possession, the
court again reversed for improper prosecutorial argument. The heroin had
been discovered in the car the defendant and his brother were diiving when
they were arrested for shoplifting. The defendant's brother, who had previously been tried and convicted for possession, testified that he alone had
possessed the heroin and that the defendant did not know of its presence.
The prosecutor argued that the defendant's brother had "not got one thing
to lose" by so testifying because under North Carolina v. Pearce,587 the
brother, whose appeal was pending, could not receive any greater punishment if retried than the seven and a half year sentence he had been assessed
at his first trial. 88 In reversing the appellant's conviction, the court of
criminal appeals stated:
A statement by counsel of what purports to be the law when same is
not contained in the court's charge is improper argument. The error
here was further compounded when the prosecutor's argument was an
statement of the law
incorrect statement of the law and such error in 8the
was to the obvious detriment of the appellant. 9
In addition, the prosecutor had stated that criminal trials unfortunately
"are not quests for truth and justice" but are merely "methods used by
persons to escape the consequences of their acts."590 The court ruled that
the harm caused by this statement was not removed by an instruction to
disregard in light of the prosecutor's continued remarks along the same vein.
580. The court distinguished Jones v. State, 520 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975), in
which the court had found an almost identical jury argument to be improper but harmless error,
because in Jones defense counsel had invited the error. 545 S.W.2d at 455.
581. Id. at 455-56.
582. 551 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
583. Id. at 383.
584. 510 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
585. In McClory the prosecutor made an almost identical remark and in overruling the
objection, the trial court compounded the error by stating, "he didn't say I did; he said I didn't
[believe it]. Overruled." Id. at 933. Because the trial court in Dunbaroverruled the objection
without comment, Dunbar suggests that the court of criminal appeals has created a per se
reversible error for such prosecutorial comment whenever objection is made and overruled.
586. 540'S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
587. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
588. 540 S.W.2d at 710.
589. Id.
590. Id.
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In Bouchillion v. State 91 the court held that the prosecutor did not commit

reversible error by telling the jury in closing argument that it could not weigh
the defendant's failure to testify in his own behalf against him

92

That

argument, the court stated, was merely a paraphrase of the court's charge.
In Gholson v. State593 the defendant appealed a capital murder conviction
for slaying a police officer. Because the prosecutor had stated, "God bless

those officers who died in the line of duty like him [the deceased], and their
families,

' 594

the defendant contended that Lopez v. State5 95 required a

mistrial. In Lopez the court held that an instruction to disregard was insufficient to cure an unsupported comment by a prosecutor that eleven officers
had been killed in America during the time the case was in trial. The court of
criminal appeals distinguished the statement in the present case because
unlike the comment in Lopez, it was not a plea to punish the defendant in
order to stop a wave of police killings or to impose punishment for the

commission of other similar crimes. 5%
In addition, the defendant argued that a mistrial should have been granted

because the prosecutor had stated, without support, "I don't recall when the
last person was electrocuted. I do know this that since the last person was
[executed] there has been a hundred percent increase in crime." 59 The court
held that although the argument598 was improper 599 it was cured by the trial
court's prompt instruction to disregard.6°
In Thornton v. State, 6° 1 a prosecution for possession of marijuana, the
defense counsel in argument stressed the State's failure to call witnesses
who were present at the transaction in which the defendant was arrested. In
591. 540 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
592. Such a statement was held harmless error in Hardy v. State, 496 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973). But see Easterling v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 219, 325 S.W.2d 138 (1959)
(prosecutor's statement, "He, the Defendant, does not have to explain anything to anybody,"
held reversible error).
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to determine if an instruction by the
trial court that the jury should not take into account the defendant's failure to testify emphasizes that fact to the defendant's detriment, rather than provides him protection. Lakeside v.
Oregon, [1978] U.S. S. CT. BULL. (CCH) B71, granting cert. to 277 Ore. 569, 561 P.2d 612
(1977). See also Lockett v. Ohio, [1978] U.S. S. CT. BULL. (CCH) B71, grantingcert. to 49 Ohio
St. 2d 48, 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976) (prosecutor's statement to effect.that evidence against
defendant was uncontroverted and unrefuted did not constitute improper comment on defendant's failure to testify). Clearly, if the trial court cannot make such a statement, the prosecutor
cannot do so. In any event, the argument could be made that the district attorney's comment
was in bad faith because it is inconceivable that such a statement was made for any other
purpose but to call to the jury's attention the defendant's failure to testify.
593. 542 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
594. Id. at 398.
595. 500 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
596. 542 S.W.2d at 399.
597. Id.
598. Presumably this argument was made at the punishment stage although the opinion does
not clearly reflect this.
599. An argument by a prosecutor that crime is on the increase has been upheld as a proper
plea for law enforcement. Cunningham v. State, 484 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). In
Gholson, however, the court ruled that the statement in question went beyond such an
assertion. 542 S.W.2d at 399.
600. The court distinguished White v. State, 492 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), where
the prosecutor argued that 60% of the crime in Dallas County could be attributed to
narcotics because "unlike the instant case, the defendant's objection to the argument was
overruled and no instruction was given to disregard." 542 S.W.2d at 399.
601. 542 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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response, the prosecutor stated that the witnesses were in the penitentiary
"on this same offense." Further, he related a pre-trial conversation that he
had held with the defense counsel concerning whether the witnesses would
appear. At that time, however, nothing in the record indicated whether the
witnesses were in fact serving time or whether the conversation had taken
place. The court of criminal appeals reversed, stating that while the prosecutor may go outside the record to meet an argument of counsel which is also
outside the record, defense counsel's argument was not beyond the record.
Consequently, the prosecutor, by injecting unsworn and inadmissible facts,
prejudiced the defendant by revealing that other persons who were severally
indicted for the same offense had been convicted. 60 2
In McClure v. State6°3 the court of criminal appeals reversed a conviction
for murder where the prosecutor during the guilt stage of the trial repeatedly
referred to the range of punishment; he argued that the defendant should not
be convicted of manslaughter because that offense carried a much lighter
sentence. The court found the fact that the jury was asked to consider "the
amount of punishment rather than the facts" to be harmful.'
An allegation of improper argument was also raised in Ramirez v. State,6°5
a robbery by firearms case in which $20,000 worth of property was stolen.
The prosecutor, in speaking to the jury, contended that "[the defendant]
that plans that kind of a robbery . . . is . . . engaged in big business, and
• . . he's got some connection some place."606 The court held that it was a
reasonable deduction from the evidence that the defendant had a place
where he planned to sell the stolen goods. Therefore, the statement was
within the proper scope of argument. 6 7
While the issue of prosecutorial references to organized crime was only
suggested in Ramirez, it was directly confronted in Dexter v. State.' In that
case the defendant appealed a conviction for commercial obscenity, alleging
prosecutorial misconduct. During the selection of the jury the prosecutor
asserted that the State would prove that a "syndicate" owned and operated
the theater where the film in question was shown. In response, the defendant secured a court order forbidding the prosecution from making any
references to "syndicate," "organized crime" or "Mafia." After the trial
began, however, the prosecutors brought into the courtroom a file cabinet,
one side of which displayed a five and one-half by eight and one-half inch
white sign on which was written in prominent red letters the words "organized crime." Moreover, during the jury argument, the prosecutor again
attempted to connect the appellant with "organized crime." The court
602.
603.
604.
605.

Accord, Walker v. State, 530 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
544 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
Id. at 393.
543 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).

606. Id. at 633.
607. Id. at 634. The court cited Pecina v. State, 516 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
Arguably, the doctrine of Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (reference
to facts not in record nor inferable therefrom improper), might apply to Ramirez if references to
organized crime were improper; in Ramirez the "big business" and having a "connection"
could reasonably have been interpreted by the jury as being linked to organized crime.
608. 544 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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rejected the argument that defense counsel failed to preserve error because
he moved for a mistrial when the cabinet was introduced rather than making
an objection and asking for an instruction. The court stated that "[a] motion
requesting the court to instruct the jury to disregard the sign on the file
cabinet would not have cured the injury 6 9 and reversed the conviction.
Similarly, in Stimack v. Texas 610 the Fifth Circuit reversed a conviction
because of prosecutorial references to organized crime. The prosecutor
introduced himself on voir dire as a member of the "organized crime
division" and in closing argument referred to the evidence as presenting
"the tip of an iceberg."1611 Additionally, during the trial several jurors
received telephone calls from a male who identified himself as counsel for
the defense and stated that if the jury did not return a verdict of "not guilty"
they would be killed by the Mafia. The jurors testified that these two factors
caused them to view the petitioner more severely than they would have
otherwise. The court held that although it was "true that the evidence
against [the] petitioners was strong," the two factors "in combination, may
well have produced just such a synergistic effect as the jurors related and
62
the trial court discerned."
E. Jury Charge
During the current survey period several convictions were overturned
because the trial court's charge to the jury authorized convictions on
theories not contained in the indictments. Thus, in Peoples v. State613 the
court of criminal appeals reversed a conviction for forgery by passing
because the trial court failed to charge the jury on the element of passing.
The trial court did instruct the jury on the issue of "making" a writing such
that it purports to be the act of another; the crime of "passing," however,
does not require that the accused himself make the forged instrument or that
it be made by one for whom he is criminally responsible.6" 4 Since the trial
court failed to apply the law of the offense alleged in the indictment, the
615
court held that fundamental error had been committed.
61 6
In Morter v. State the defendant appealed a conviction for the offense
of injury to a child. The indictment alleged that the accused had caused
"serious bodily injury ' 617 to the child, whereas the charge allowed a conviction for serious bodily injury as well as "serious physical deficiency or
impairment" or "deformity.1 61 8 Because the charge authorized the jury to
609. Id. at 428.
610. 548 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1977).

611. Id.
612. Id.at 589.
613. 548 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
614. Id.at 895.
615. Id.
616. 551 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
617. "Serious bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of
death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment
of the function of any bodily member or organ." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(34) (Vernon
1974).
618. Id.§ 22.04 provides that "a person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or with criminal negligence, engages in conduct that causes serious bodily injury,
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convict on theories other than those alleged in the indictment,6 19 the error
was held to be fundamental.62 °
Similarly, in Long v. State621 the court reversed a conviction for theft
because the charge authorized conviction for an offense not alleged in the
indictment. The court noted that there are four possible ways to commit
theft under the Penal Code. 622 The indictment in this instance alleged that the
defendant obtained and exercised control over the property without the
effective consent of the owner. 623 The charge to the jury, however, aucontrol over the property
thorized a conviction for obtaining and62exercising
4
knowing that the property was stolen.
626
625
was reversed in Sutton v. State
A conviction for aggravated assault
because the trial court did not submit a charge to the jury on the lesser
included offense of resisting arrest. 627 The defendant was charged with
aggravated assault for striking a police officer as he attempted to arrest the
defendant. Because resisting arrest is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault 628 and the evidence was sufficient to raise that issue, 629 the
court held that defendant was entitled to an appropriate instruction on
resisting arrest.
In Shippy v. State63 the defendant contended on appeal from a capital
murder conviction that the trial court erred in declining to submit a circumstantial evidence charge at the punishment stage of his trial. He argued that
he was entitled to such a charge on the issue of the probability that he would
commit "future acts of violence constituting a continuing threat to soci-

ety.- 631 Relying on the opinion in Stocks v. State, 632 the court of criminal
appeals determined that a charge on circumstantial evidence is necessary
only when the "main facts essential to guilt" are circumstantial. Since in

serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment, or deformity to a child who is fourteen
years of age or younger."
619. The charge permitted the jury to convict if they found that the defendant had engaged
in any of the conduct prohibited in the statute. The court refused to hold that "serious bodily
injury" encompasses "serious physical deficiency or impairment" or "deformity" because the
former term is statutorily defined while the latter is not. 551 S.W.2d at 718.
620. Apparently the error was not an assigned error on appeal. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 40.09, § 13 (Vernon 1965).
621. 548 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
622. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon 1974); Ex parte Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
623. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 31.03(b)(1) (Vernon 1974).
624. Id. § 31.03(b)(2)
(formerly known as "receiving stolen property").
625. Id. § 22.0 2 (a)(2).
626. 548 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
627. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 38.03(a) (Vernon 1974).
628. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978) provides: "An offense
is a lesser included offense if: (I) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged." The court found that the facts
required to show a violation of § 38.03 were the same ones necessary to demonstrate the
commission of aggravated assault. 548 S.W.2d at 699.
629. The court held that the issue was raised even though the arresting officer did not advise
the defendant that he was making an arrest. It was sufficient that the jury could have reasonably believed that an arrest was being attempted; in this case the police officer testified that he
grabbed the defendant and attempted "to make an apprehension for disorderly conduct." 548
S.W.2d at 700.
630. 556 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
631. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.07(l)(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
632. 147 Tex. Crim. 164, 179 S.W.2d 305 (1943).

